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A B S T R A C T
The existence of adversarial examples has led to considerable uncertainty re-
garding the trust one can justifiably put in predictions produced by automated
systems. This uncertainty has, in turn, lead to considerable research effort in
understanding adversarial robustness. In this work, we take first steps towards
separating robustness analysis from the choice of robustness threshold and norm.
We propose robustness curves as a more general view of the robustness behavior
of a model and investigate under which circumstances they can qualitatively
depend on the chosen norm.
1 I N T R O D U C T I O N
Robustness of machine learning models has recently attracted massive research interest. This
interest is particularly pronounced in the context of deep learning. On the one hand, this is due
to the massive success and widespread deployment of deep learning. On the other hand, it is due
to the intriguing properties that can be demonstrated for deep learning (although these are not
unique to this setting): the circumstance that deep learning can produce models that achieve or
surpass human-level performance in a wide variety of tasks, but completely disagree with human
judgment after application of imperceptible perturbations [1]. The ability of a classifier to maintain
its performance under such changes to the input data is commonly referred to as robustness to
adversarial perturbations.
In order to better understand adversarial robustness, recent years have seen the development of a
host of methods that produce adversarial examples, in the white box and black box settings, with
specific or arbitrary target labels, and varying additional constraints [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. There has also
been a push towards training regimes that produce adversarially robust networks, such as data
augmentation with adversarial examples or distillation [7, 8, 9, 10]. The difficulty faced by such
approaches is that robustness is difficult to measure and quantify: even if a model is shown to
be robust against current state of the art attacks, this does not exclude the possibility that newly
devised attacks may be successful [11]. The complexity of deep learning models and counter-
intuitive nature of some phenomena surrounding adversarial examples further make it challenging
to understand the impact of robust training or the properties that determine whether a model is
robust or non-robust. Recent work has highlighted settings where no model can be simultaneously
accurate and robust [12], or where finding a model that is simultaneously robust and accurate
requires optimizing over a different hypothesis class than finding one that is simply accurate [13].
These examples rely on linear models, as they are easy for humans to understand. They analyze
robustness properties for a fixed choice of norm and, typically, a fixed disadvantageous perturbation
size (dependent on the model). This raises the question: “How do the presented results depend
on the choice of norm, choice of perturbation size, and choice of linear classifier as a hypothesis
class?”
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Adversarial Robustness Curves
In this contribution, we:
• propose robustness curves as a way of better representing adversarial robustness in place
of “point-wise” measures,
• show that linear classifiers are not sufficient to illustrate all interesting robustness phenom-
ena, and
• investigate how robustness curves may depend on the choice of norm.
2 D E F I N I T I O N S
In the following, we assume data (x, y) ∈ X × Y , X ⊆ Rd, are generated i.i.d. according to
distribution P with marginal PX . Let f : X → Y denote some classifier and let x ∈ X . The
standard loss of f on P is
L(f) := P ({(x, y) : f(x) 6= y}) . (1)
Let n : X → R+ be some norm, let ε ≥ 0 and let
Bn(x, ε) := {x′ : n(x− x′) ≤ ε} . (2)
Following [12], we define the ε-adversarial loss of f regarding P and n as
Ln,ε(f) := P ({(x, y) : ∃x′ ∈ Bn(x, ε) : f(x′) 6= y}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Anε
) . (3)
We have Ln,0(f) = L(f). Alternatively, we can exclude from this definition any points that are
initially misclassified by the model, and instead consider as adversarial examples all points where
the model changes its behavior under small perturbations. Then the ε-margin loss is defined as
L′n,ε(f) := PX({x : ∃x′ ∈ Bn(x, ε) : f(x′) 6= f(x)}) . (4)
L′n,ε is the weight of all points within an ε-margin of a decision boundary. We have L
′
n,0(f) = 0.
There are two somewhat arbitrary choices in the definition in Equations (3) and (4): the choice of ε
and the choice of the norm n. The aim of this contribution is to investigate how ε and n impact the
adversarial robustness.
3 R O B U S T N E S S C U RV E S
As a first step towards understanding robustness globally, instead of for an isolated perturbation
size ε, we propose to view robustness as a function of ε. This yields an easy-to-understand visual
representation of adversarial robustness in the form of a robustness curve.
Definition 1 The robustness curve of a classifier f , given a norm n and underlying distribution P ,
is the curve defined by
rf,n,P : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] (5)
ε 7→ Ln,ε(f) . (6)
The margin curve of f given n and P is the curve defined by
r′f,n,P : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] (7)
ε 7→ L′n,ε(f) . (8)
Commonly chosen norms for the investigation of adversarial robustness are the `1 norm (denoted
by ‖ · ‖1), the `2 norm (denoted by ‖ · ‖2), and the `∞ norm (denoted by ‖ · ‖∞). In the following,
we will investigate robustness curves for these three choices of n.
Tsipras et al. [12] propose a distribution P1 where y
u. a. r.∼ {−1,+1} and
x1 =
{
1 w. p. p
−1 w. p. (1− p) x2, . . . , xd+1
i. i. d.∼ N (ηy, 1). (9)
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Figure 1: Margin curves and robustness curves for several examples of distributions and linear
models from the literature. Row a) shows curves for classifier favg and distribution P1. Row b)
shows curves for classifier frob and distribution P1. In this case, all three curves are identical and
thus appear as one. Row c) shows curves for classifier fs and distribution P2.
For this distribution, they show that the linear classifier favg(x) = sign(wTx) with w =
(0, 1/d, . . . , 1/d) has high accuracy, but low ε-robustness in `∞ norm for ε ≥ 2η, while the
classifier frob(x) = sign(wTx) with w = (1, 0, . . . , 0) has high ε-robustness for ε < 1, but low
accuracy. Nakkiran [13] proposes a distribution P2 where y
u. a. r.∼ {−1,+1} and
xi =
{
y w. p. 0.51
−y w. p. 0.49 (10)
where the linear classifier fs(x) = sign(wTx) with w = ~1d has high accuracy, but low ε-robustness
in `∞ norm for ε ≥ 12 . Figure 1 shows margin curves and robustness curves for P1 and favg, P1
and frob and P2 and fs.
4 T H E I M PA C T O F n
The curves shown in Figure 1 seem to behave similarly for each norm. Is this always the case?
Indeed, if f is a linear classifier parameterized by normal vector w and offset b, denote by
dn((w, b), x) = min{n(v) : ∃p : x = p+ v, 〈w, p〉+ b = 0} (11)
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the shortest distance between (w, b) and x in norm n. Then a series of algebraic manipulations
yield
d‖·‖1((w, b), x) =
|b+ 〈w, x〉|
‖w‖∞ , (12)
d‖·‖2((w, b), x) =
|b+ 〈w, x〉|
‖w‖2 , (13)
d‖·‖∞((w, b), x) =
|b+ 〈w, x〉|
‖w‖1 . (14)
In particular, there exist constants c and c′ depending on (w, b) such that for all x ∈ X ,
d‖·‖1((w, b), x) = cd‖·‖2((w, b), x) = c
′d‖·‖∞((w, b), x) (15)
This implies the following Theorem:
Theorem 1 For any linear classifier f , there exist constants c, c′ > 0 such that for any ε ≥ 0,
L‖·‖1,ε(f) = L‖·‖2,ε/c(f) = L‖·‖∞,ε/c′(f) . (16)
As a consequence, for linear classifiers, dependence of robustness curves on the choice of norm is
purely a matter of compression and elongation.
What can we say about classifiers with more complex decision boundaries? For all x, we have
‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x‖1 ≤
√
d‖x‖2 ≤ d‖x‖∞ . (17)
These inequalities are tight, i.e. there for each inequality there exists some x such that equality
holds. It follows that, for any ε > 0,
A
‖·‖∞
ε/d ⊆ A‖·‖2ε/√d ⊆ A
‖·‖1
ε ⊆ A‖·‖2ε ⊆ A‖·‖∞ε (18)
and so
L‖·‖∞,ε(f) ≥ L‖·‖2,ε(f) ≥ L‖·‖1,ε(f) (19)
≥ L‖·‖2,ε/√d(f) ≥ L‖·‖1,ε/d(f) . (20)
In particular, the robustness curve for the `∞-norm is always an upper bound for the robustness
curve for any other `p-norm (since ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖∞ for all x and p ≥ 1). Thus, for linear classifiers
as well as classifiers with more complicated decision boundaries, in order to show that a model is
adversarially robust for any fixed norm, it is sufficient to show that it exhibits the desired robustness
behavior for the `∞-norm. On the other hand, in order to show that a model is not adversarially
robust, showing this for the `∞ norm does not necessarily imply the same qualities in another norm,
as the robustness curves may be strongly separated in high-dimensional spaces, both for linear and
non-linear models.
Contrary to linear models, for more complicated decision boundaries, robustness curves may also
exhibit qualitatively different behavior. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The decision boundary in
each case is given by a quadratic model in 2-dimensional space: f(~x) = sign(x21 − x2). In the
first example, we construct a finite set of points, all at `2-distance 1 from the decision boundary,
but at various `1 and `∞ distances. For any distribution concentrated on a set of such points,
the `2-robustness curve jumps from zero to one at a single threshold value, while the `1- and
`∞-robustness curves are step functions with the height of the steps determined by the distribution
across the points and the width determined by the variation in `1 or `∞ distances from the decision
boundary. The robustness curves in this example also exhibit, at some points, the maximal possible
separation by a factor of
√
d (note that d = 2) while touching in other points. In the second
example, we show a continuous version of the same phenomenon, with points inside and outside
the parabola distributed at constant `2-distance from the decision boundary, but with varying `1 and
`∞ distances. As a result, the robustness curves for different norms are qualitatively different. The
third example, on the other hand, shows a setting where the robustness curves for the three norms
are both quantitatively and qualitatively similar.
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Figure 2: Margin curves and robustness curves for f(~x) = sign(x21 − x2) and three different
underlying distributions, illustrating varying behavior of the robustness curves for different norms.
In rows a) and b), the robustness curves are qualitatively different, while they are almost identical
in row c). Note that in these examples, robustness curves and margin curves are nearly identical, as
the standard loss of f is zero or close to zero in all cases.
These examples drive home two points:
• The robustness properties of a classifier may depend both quantitatively and qualitatively
on the norm chosen to measure said robustness. When investigating robustness, it is
therefore imperative to consider which norm, or, more broadly, which concept of closeness
best represents the type of perturbation to guard against.
• Linear classifiers are not a sufficient tool for understanding adversarial robustness in
general, as they in effect neutralize a degree of freedom given by the choice of norm.
5 D I S C U S S I O N
We have proposed robustness curves as a more general perspective on the robustness properties of
a classifier and have discussed how these curves can or cannot be affected by the choice of norm.
Robustness curves are a tool for a more principled investigation of adversarial robustness, while
their dependence on a chosen norm underscores the necessity of basing robustness analyses on a
clear problem definition that specifies what kind of perturbations a model should be robust to. We
note that the use of `p norms in current research is frequently meant only as an approximation of
a “human perception distance” [14]. A human’s ability to detect a perturbation depends on the
5
Adversarial Robustness Curves
point the perturbation is applied to, meaning that human perception distance is not a homogeneous
metric, and thus not induced by a norm. In this sense, where adversarial robustness is meant to
describe how faithful the behavior of a model matches that of a human, the adversarial loss in
Equation (3) can only be seen as a starting point of analysis. Nonetheless, since perturbations
with small `p-norm are frequently imperceptible to humans, adversarial robustness regarding some
`p-norm is a reasonable lower bound for adversarial robustness in human perception distance. In
future work, we would like to investigate how robustness curves can be estimated for deep networks
and extend the definition to robustness against targeted attacks.
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